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CommNuNiTy NhoPETY-ANTENupnAL DEBTs-EMNATING Im-
mUNITY oF EARNINGs AND ACCUMULATIONS OF DEBTOR SPOUSE.-
1CW 26.16.200, as amended by Ch. 121, Laws of 1969, Ist Extra-
ordinary Session.
At common law, the husband assumed his wife's antenuptial debts.'
The various married women's acts have often relieved him of this
liability, so that each spouse controls the disposition of his or her sole
property.2 In Washington, a community property state, the determina-
tion of debt liability of spouses has followed a more labyrinthine pro-
cess. Husband, wife, and the community 4 represent a trio of interests,
and it is necessary to categorize assets and obligations as community
2R. TYLER, I sAcY AN CovERTuRE § 216 (2d ed. 1882). The creditor was required
to obtain judgment against the husband during coverture.
218 VA. L. REv. 795 (1932). See Smith v. Martin, 124 Mich. 34, 82 N.W. 662 (1900);
contra, Kies v. Young, 64 Ark. 381, 42 S.W. 669 (1897).
'The community property system is also followed in Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas. There is, however, no uniform treatment
of antenuptial obligations among the community property states.
'The marital community "seems to defy precise definition." Household Finance
Corp. of Sioux Falls v. Smith, 70 Wn. 2d 401, 403, 423 P.2d 621, 622 (1967). In some
situations it has been treated as an entity distinct from husband and wife as individuals,
Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892); yet in others the entity analysis
has been rejected, Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930). Its existence
requires a valid marriage, although equity may protect an innocent party if the marriage
proves to be void, Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951). The
community generally continues for as long as the marital relationship-until death
or divorce, Barkley v. American Say. Bank, 61 Wash. 415, 112 P. 495 (1911). While
the spouses are separated, however, no community interest arises with respect to the
earnings and accumulations of the wife. WASH. Rxv. CODE § 26.16.140 (1958):
The earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor children living with
her, or in her custody while she is living separate from her husband, are the
separate property of the wife.
Despite a lack of similar statutory protection, the husband's earnings during separation
are also held to be separate in nature, unless the separation was, in fact, desertion.
The court has based this result either on an implied agreement between the separated
spouses, In re Janssen's Estate, 56 Wn. 2d 150, 351 P.2d 510 (1960), or on the
absence of joint acquisition of the affected property, Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn. 2d
844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948); In re Armstrong's Estate, 33 Wn. 2d 118, 204 P.2d 500
(1949). In Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963), however, the
"community" survived the separation. The wife was confined to a mental institution;
the husband could have obtained a divorce, but did not. Despite a lack of opportunity
to acquire property jointly, the court held that property acquired during this time was
community in nature, since the husband had not affirmatively renounced the marital
relationship.
See also Yates v. Dohring, 24 Wn. 2d 877, 168 P.2d 404 (1946), where the absence
of a "community" or "family relationship" barred the creditor's recovery for family
support specified in WAsH. R.v. CODE § 26.16.205 (1958).
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or separate. 5 In the past, community assets could be reached only by
community creditors. 6 Separate obligations, whether incurred before or
after marriage, were identified solely with the individual incurring
them; only the debtor spouse's separate property could be attached to
satisfy them.7
As a consequence, the separate creditor was often frustrated in
attempting to collect a debt. So long as the marriage continued, com-
munity assets were reserved for community obligations. Further, while
the marriage continued, creditors could not secure partition of com-
munity assets.8 Overriding the frustration of creditors was a policy
favoring protection of the community. The statutory means selected
was insulation of community assets from separate debts, to assure the
community enough integrity to allow development without handicaps
unrelated to its own undertakings.' Since this insulation is most ap-
parent at the instant of marriage, it has been known popularly as
marital bankruptcy.' °
Washington case law has made some inroads into the insulation of
community assets, based on policy considerations favoring alimony.
In Fisch v. Marler," the husband's remarriage did not prevent his first
wife from garnishing his salary to satisfy alimony obligations. In
11 W. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 158 (1943) [hereinafter
cited as DR FUNIAK]; Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 23 P. 688 (1890). As to the
definition of community property, WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1958) provides in
part:
Property not acquired or owned [,] as prescribed in RCW 26.16.010 and 26.16.020
[defining the separate property of the husband and wife] [,] acquired after
marriage by either husband or wife or both, is community property.
6 With the permission of the non-debtor spouse, of course, community assets may
be applied to separate debts; the result is a gift by the non-debtor. Page v. Prudential
Life Ins. Co., 12 Wn. 2d 101, 112, 120 P.2d 527, 532 (1942).7 Brotton v. Langert, 1 Wash. 73, 23 P. 688 (1890) (community real estate immune
from husband's separate debt) ; Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917)
(same result as to community personal property). In Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash.
730, 731, 31 P. 24 (1892), the court reasoned:
It has been held by us that neither the husband or wife can alienate or convey
his or her interest in community real estate separately during the lifetime of the
community, and if neither of them have a right to sell or convey the same to
any third person, creditors can have no greater right therein.
'Stockland v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892).
0DE FuNIAK, supra note 5, at § 156. The concept accords with Spanish law, which
decreed that the community should pay only its own obligations.
"
0 See, e.g., Mechem, Creditors' Rights in Community Property, 11 WASHr. L. REV.
80, 87 (1936); Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REV.
640, 666 (1955).
"1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
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Stafford v. Stafford, 2 however, the policy considerations were not suffi-
ciently strong to allow the first wife to attach community real property
acquired during the second marriage of the husband. Federal tax law
has also diluted the immunity."3 The most recent and significant abro-
gation, however, is statutory. During the 1969 Extraordinary Session,
the Washington Legislature rendered the community less inviolate by
making the "earnings and accumulations" of each spouse liable for his
antenuptial debts, provided the creditor secures judgment within three
years of the marriage. The statute adds "[f]or the purpose of this
section neither the husband nor the wife shall be construed to have any
interest in the earnings of the other."'1 4
The statute allows antenuptial creditors access to what would other-
wise be insulated community assets. This note addresses questions
raised by the new statutory language-the meaning of "debts" and
"accumulations", the impact of the statute if the marriage preceded
the effective date of the statute (August 11, 1969) by less than three
years, and the effects on the husband's role as community manager.
I. DEBTS
The 1969 amendment represents a triumph of the credit economy
over prior policy' by making certain assets available to creditors for
- 10 Wn. 2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941).
"Draper v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Wash. 1965); contra, Stone v.
United States, 225 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Wash. 1963). See also 41 WAsr. L. REV. 356(1966).
2"Ch. 121 [1969] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess., amended WAsHr. Ray. CODE § 26.16.200,
to read:
Neither husband or wife is liable for the debts or liabilities of the other incurred
before marriage, nor for the separate debts of each other, nor is the rent or
income of the separate property of either liable for the separate debts of the other:
PROVIDED, That the earnings and accumulations of the husband shall be
available to the legal process of creditors for the satisfaction of debts incurred
by him prior to marriage, and the earnings and accumulations of the wife
shall be available to the legal process of creditors for the satisfaction of debts
incurred by her prior to marriage. For the purpose of this section neither the
husband nor the wife shall be construed to have any interest in the earnings
of the other: PROVIDED FURTHER, That no separate debt may be the
basis of a claim against the earnings and accumulations of either a husband
or wife unless the same is reduced to judgment within three years of the
marriage of the parties. (Boldfacing indicates the amended portion)
r' See 41 VAsH. L. REv. 356 (1966); W. BROCKELSANK;, THE Coicauvn= PRoPERTY
LAW OF IDAHo 284 (1962); Cross, Law Revision in the State of Washington, 27 WASH.
L. REV. 193 (1952).
But cf. DE FUNmx, supra note 5, § 158:
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the satisfaction of antenuptial debts. In 1968, similar legislation was
enacted in Texas." Interestingly the Texas statute includes liabilities
as well as debts. The Washington Legislature either deliberately ex-
cluded such antenuptial liabilities as tort judgments, overlooked them,
or intended the term "debt" to apply broadly to a sum owed from
whatever origin.
In dictum, the Washington court has stated that a debt ordinarily
is an obligation arising from contract.'" Other decisions have warned
that statutory references to debts must be understood in context.' The
portion of the statute unaltered by the 1969 amendment refers both
to debts and liabilities, suggesting the legislature was aware of the
distinction, made a conscious choice in not including the more inclusive
term "liabilities", and did not intend a broader meaning be imputed to
the term "debts." From the standpoint of either test--ordinary mean-
ing or context-the term "debts" as used here appears limited to con-
tractual obligations.
II. ACCUMULATIONS
Of more concern, because of novelty and effect, is the problem of
accumulations. What are they, and to what extent are they available
to antenuptial creditors? The new statute adds a proviso which makes
each spouse's earnings and accumulations available, but also provides
that "[flor the purpose of this section neither [spouse] shall be con-
So far as the "bankruptcy" argument is concerned, the fact remains that few
people marry or could be expected to marry for the reason that thereby they
would escape existing debt liability. That is not and never will be the compelling
reason for marriage. . . .The real question involved in the matter is whether the
law ...will give more consideration to the well-being and interests of the family
or to the rights of the creditors.
6 TEX. RaV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4620 (1968) provides in part:
The community property subject to sole or joint management, control and dispo-
sition of a spouse shall be subject to the liabilities of that spouse incurred before
or during marriage.
"7 Commercial State Bank v. Curtis, 7 Wn. 2d 296, 298, 109 P.2d 558, 559 (1941).
"8Compare Spokane Merchants' Assn. v. State, 15 Wn. 2d 186, 130 P.2d 373 (1942)
("Debts due to the United States" under 31 U.S.C. § 191 include delinquent taxes.
Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926)); with Hewitt v. Traders' Bank, 18 Wash.
326, 51 P. 468 (1897) (Taxes not debts in the ordinary sense of the word); and
Haakenson v. Coldiron, 190 Wash. 627, 70 P.2d 294 (1937) (Alimony not a debt or
liability under statute exempting the proceeds of accident and health insurance from
husband's debts); and In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 66 P. 425 (1901) (Alimony not a
debt in the sense that word is used in WAsH. CONST. art. I, § 17, prohibiting imprison-
ment for debt).
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strued to have any interest in the earnings of the other."' 9 Does the
omission of the term "accumulations" in the latter provision mean that
each spouse may retain some interest in the accumulations? Such an
interpretation could leave the Stafford result intact.
The term "accumulations" has apparently never been defined in
Washington. It made an early appearance in a California statute relat-
ing to the wife's separate earnings.2" Washington 2 and Arizona22
adopted similar legislation later.-The California court has defined the
term as a catch-all description of any property which a person acquires
and retains, regardless of the manner of acquisition.2 3 In practical
application, the term encompasses all property which cannot be deemed
"earnings." From this perspective, examples of accumulations include
property acquired by adverse possession,24 funds advanced on a con-
tract,25 damages recovered through tort claims,20 and property ac-
quired through purchase or exchange.
Ch. 121 [1969] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess., set out in full, note 14 supra.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 169 (West 1954) (enacted in 1872) provides:
The earnings and accumulations of the wife, and of her minor children living with
her or in her custody, while she is living separate from her husband, are the
separate property of the wife.
2 WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.140 (1958) (enacted in 1881) provides:
The earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor children living
with her, or in her custody while she is living separate from her husband, are the
separate property of the wife.
The husband has no similar statutory protection. But see note 4 supra.
2 ARiz. REv. STAT. AxN. § 25-213 (1956) (enacted in 1901) provides in part:
The earnings and accumulations of the wife and the minor children in her custody
while she lives separate and apart from her husband are the separate property
of the wife.
1 Union Oil Co. v. Stewart, 158 Cal. 149, 110 P. 313 (1910).
'LId. The court held that the wife, separated from her husband, acquired some of
his separate real property by adverse possession. It became a separate accumulation
of the wife's and unavailable to the husband's separate creditor. Referring to accumula-
tions, the court noted:
When one speaks generally of accumulation of property, he is understood to
refer to any property which a person acquires and retains, without regard to
the means by which it is obtained. Of course, if it were acquired by the wife by
purchase with community funds, or in exchange for other community property,
it would not be [separately] accumulated in the sense here involved. Such an
acquisition would be a mere exchange, and it would have the character possessed
by that given in exchange for it. But where the wife, while living separate from
her husband, through her own industry, labor, skill, or efforts of any kind, obtains
property and holds it in possession, it is what would ordinarily be called an
accumulation of property, and, under the rules stated in section 169, it would be
a part of her separate estate.
Id. at 316.
,=Tagus Ranch Co. v. First Natl Bank of Clovis, 7 Cal. App. 2d 457, 46 P.2d 809
(1935). -
I City of Phoenix v. Dickson, 40 Ariz. 403, 12 P.2d 618 (1932); Christiana v. Rose,
100 Cal. App. 2d 46, 222 P.2d 891 (1950) (wrongful death).IUnion Oil Co. v. Stewart, 158 Cal. 149, 110 P. 313 (1910).
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After identifying a specific asset as an accumulation, the California
court then characterizes it either as separate or community.28 Where
the accumulation was acquired through either exchange or purchase,
it retains the character of the source assets. Determination of its
character, therefore, is a tracing exercise. Where the asset was acquired
in the first instance as an accumulation (no exchange or purchase), it
is characterized according to the mode of acquisition 29 or status of the
acquiring party. In a Washington tort situation, for example, the
wife's recovery may be separate in nature if the spouses are sep-
arated,30 or community in nature if cohabitation exists.3
Assuming the Washington court develops an analysis of accumula-
tions not inconsistent with the California experience, the omission of
the term from the latter portion of the new statute should have these
consequences: Realty purchased with the debtor spouse's earnings, as
in Stafford, will be available to the debtor spouse's antenuptial cred-
itors, since the statute restricts the non-debtor spouse's interest in the
source asset. Assets acquired in the form of community accumulations,
without any element of exchange or purchase (such as a tort re-
covery) , however, are not entirely subject under the statute, if at all.
The importance lies in the method of acquisition of this latter sort of
2 Id.
2 CAL. Civ. CODE § 162 (West 1954) provides in part:
All property of the wife, owned by her before marriage, and that acquired
afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, issues, and profits
thereof, is her separate property.
The husband receives similar protection under CAL. CiV. CODE § 163 (West 1954).
'o Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wn. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961). See WASH. REv. CODE §
26.16.140 (1958), cited in full in note 21, sufra.
"Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn. 2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959); Clark v. Beggs, 138 Wash. 62,
244 p. 121 (1926).
'See Clark v. Beggs, 138 Wash. 62, 244 P. 121 (1926). The court affirmed a
judgment n.o.v. The plaintiff failed to join the party who was her husband when the
injuries were sustained, having become divorced from him after the cause of action
arose. The plaintiff appears to have argued part of the damages were loss of income,
which the wife could recover without joinder, but the court declined to investigate
the elements of the recovery.
For discussion purposes, the tort situation has been chosen, rather than the case of
adverse possession. The latter situation will not arise under the new statute, because
the period of time necessary to claim by adverse possession exceeds the three year
statute of limitations included in the principal statute.
Other examples of accumulations which are community in their inception are:
(1) a gift, devise or bequest to husband and wife (In re Salvini's Estate, 65 Wn. 2d 442,
397 P.2d 811 (1964)) and (2) a similar transfer to one spouse after the spouses have
executed a community property agreement which converts all separate property into
community property, including future acquisitions (In re Brown's Estate, 29 Wn. 2d 20,
185 P.2d 125 (1947)).
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accumulation. While a tort recovery is clearly an accumulation of the
acquiring spouse, 3 the statute does not, unlike the situation with
earnings, restrict the present interest of the other spouse in this com-
munity asset. Consequently, while the statute makes an accumulation
of the debtor spouse (community in its inception) available to the
debtor spouse's antenuptial creditors, it does not specify that the non-
debtor spouse shall have no interest in such an accumulation.
Whether or not the statute authorizes the antenuptial creditor to
attach this asset to the extent of the debtor spouse's interest therein is
at best questionable. The normal way to reach only the debtor's inter-
est in an asset is through partition. However, unlike property held in
tenancy in common, community property is not subject to partition
in the absence of mutual consent or divorce. 4 Each spouse has an un-
divided one-half interests5 which permeates the whole asset; "neither
member of the community has any independent proprietary interest
or right in [community property]."" If the new statute is read to
authorize partition, it must overrule this formidable line of authority;
such divisibility would, as well, lead to considerable confusion in char-
acterizing the remaining proceeds.37
'For some purposes, at least, the Washington court has considered the community
as if it were a distinct entity. For purposes of defining the manner in which property
acquires its community character, however, WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1958)
provides, insofar as is applicable here, that property acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife or both is community property. Thus it is not entirely correct to say
the community acquires property, but rather, that property is acquired by the spouse(s)
as community property. Compare Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co., 107
Wash. 678, 182 P. 630 (1919) and Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 Wash. Ter. 235, 3 P. 841
(1882) with Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930). See also G. McKAY,
Coi uNr=y POPERTY §§ 120, 121, 123, 124 (1910).
See note 7 supra.
In addition to the ownership interest in an undivided one-half of the community
asset, one spouse could conceivably have a further claim against the asset in the form
of an equitable lien. If separate property of one spouse is used to finance valuable
improvements on the community realty, that spouse, in a subsequent action involving
partition, may be entitled to an equitable lien for reimbursement. Bishop v. Lynch,
8 Wn. 2d 278, 111 P.2d 996 (1941).
Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 315, 166 P. 634, 637 (1917).
1 If partition is allowed, proceeds from the severance which are not available might
retain their community character. Under this analysis the new statute operates to
dilute the interest of the non-debtor spouse in the community accumulation since
each spouse has an undivided one-half interest in the remaining proceeds. Consequently,
with reference to the community accumulation prior to partition, the interest of the
non-debtor spouse is eventually reduced to one-fourth.
This result could be avoided by characterizing the assets which remain after partition
as the separate property of the non-debtor spouse. However, if so characterized, the
assets would then become available to separate creditors of the non-debtor spouse.
Under this analysis, claims which have been consistently rejected by the Washington
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An interim summary indicates the following items are available to
the antenuptial creditor. First, as was the case before the 1969 amend-
ment, an accumulation is available to the extent that its origin is trace-
able to the separate property of the debtor spouse. Second, an accumu-
lation is available to the extent that its origin is traceable to the debtor
spouse's earnings. Third, a spouse's individual earnings are available.
Finally, an asset acquired by the debtor spouse as a community
accumulation in the first instance may be available to the extent of
the debtor spouse's interest therein, but only if the principal statute is
construed to allow partition.
III. DUE PROCESS
The new statute introduces short-term vulnerability to community
property. Certain types of community property are made vulnerable
by the statute to specified creditors during the initial three years of
marriage. 8 Although no effective legal objection can be raised regard-
ing the application of the statute to marriages contracted after the
effective date of the statute, serious doubts arise as to the possibility
of its retroactive application. Under its three-year limitation period,
the statute ostensibly could affect all persons who married after August
11, 1966. An argument can be made for comprehensively including
assets of such unions within the scope of the statute on the ground
that remedial legislation should be as far-reaching as possible, even
court, as in Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892) and Schramm v. Steele,
97 Wash. 309, 166 P. 634 (1917), would now be subject to realization through a
two step process. First, a postnuptial separate creditor who seeks to satisfy his claim
out of comunity property must find an antenuptial creditor of the other spouse who
is able to accomplish partition under the principal statute. Then the postnuptial creditor
could enforce his claim against the remaining proceeds.
Therefore, if divisibility is allowed under the new statute, the non-debtor spouse
occupies a particularly unattractive position; for if the proceeds which remain after
partition are deemed community, his original interest is diluted, and if those proceeds
are deemed separate, they become available to his separate creditors.
' With respect to judgments rendered within the specified three years, the period
of vulnerability will extend an additional six years under WAsH. REv. Con § 6.04.010
(1957), which provides for execution within six years of the judgment. Consequently,
assuming a valid antenuptial obligation exists which is not itself barred by WAsH. REv.
CoD ch. 4.16 (1956) (Limitation of Actions), the period of vulnerability could
conceivably extend for a total of nine years.
Query why the statute provides that the claim must be reduced to judgment within
the initial three years. This would seem to place a premium on defendants who are
particularly adept at securing continuances or other means to delay judicial resolution.
Perhaps the legislature should have provided, rather, that suit must be commenced
within the initial three years of the marriage.
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when legislative intent is imperfectly expressed.89 Furthermore, com-
munity property protections are not of an inherent nature, but rather
result from statutory exemptions; the principal statute simply re-
moves certain exemptions. Opposing these contentions are two others
which seem more compelling-a statute cannot abrogate vested prop-
erty rights, and the creation of a remedy where none existed pre-
viously is something more than remedial in nature, deserving only
prospective application."
That married couples have vested rights in community assets is well
settled.41 One spouse's interest in the future earnings of the other,
however, would not appear to be a presently vested right protected by
due process. With respect to community property extant at the effec-
tive date of the statute, the spouses have presently vested rights which
should remain unaffected. The statute cannot affect any earnings or
accumulations in existence on that date, nor assets traceable thereto.
In contrast, the statute can, and therefore, probably does, affect the
non-debtor spouse's inchoate interest in the other spouse's prospective
earnings and accumulations which materialize subsequent to the effec-
tive date of the statute.
The statute, however, probably is not restricted to prospective debts.
If the statute were applied to debts incurred prior to the effective date
of the statute, it would not alter the contractual agreement between
debtor and creditor, but merely would provide a remedy which had
not previously existed, and any improper retroactive impact is elim-
inated if, as indicated above, that remedy is allowed only against
earnings and accumulations which accrue after the effective date of
the statute.
IV. THE HUSBAND AS MANAGER
The husband's role as community manager 4 poses an added prob-
lem under the statute. Prior to this enactment, he could not use com-
Pape v. Dept. of Labor & Ind., 43 Wn. 2d 736, 264 P.2d 241 (1953).
"See National Bank of Commerce v. Green, 1 Wn. App. 713, 721, 463 P.2d 187, 192
(1969) (apparently holding the statute does not affect assets acquired prior to statute's
effective date.)
"Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 116 P. 634 (1917); see also Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937) (although the right does not extend
so far as to allow a spouse to sell separately his interest in community property,
Stockand v. Bartlett, 4 Wash. 730, 31 P. 24 (1892)).
WA H. REV. CoDE § 26.16.040 (1958) provides in part:
The husband has the management and control of the community real property,
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munity assets to satisfy a separate obligation.43 May he do so now
and apply his own contributions to an antenuptial debt? If he does,
should he be considered a "volunteer"? May the wife apply her earn-
ings to a similar debt of her own? Presumably, as manager of the
community and controller of litigation," the husband might apply his
earnings in the face of an undisputed debt which the antenuptial
creditor was assured of reducing to judgment within the three year
period. Rather than being a mere volunteer, he would, indirectly, be
acting for the benefit of the community,4" reducing its losses should
the creditor present a costs-added judgment.
The same conclusion may attach to the wife's voluntary satisfac-
tion of antenuptial debts. Although the husband is community man-
ager, the assets he manages are unsettled under the statute. Since
neither spouse has an interest in the other's earnings with respect to
creditors' remedies under the statute, the certainty of a judgment
might allow the wife a similar power of protective satisfaction.
CONCLUSION
Under the 1969 amendment to the Washington community property
scheme, community assets are temporarily vulnerable to the claims
of antenuptial creditors. Until a three-year period closes it will be
impossible to identify insulated community assets with any precision.
In view of the legislature's decision not to use the more inclusive term
"liabilities", debts would appear to be limited to those of a contractual
but he shall not sell, convey or encumber, the community real estate, unless the
wife join with him in executing the deed or other instrument of conveyance by
which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and such deed or other
instrument of conveyance must be acknowledged by him and his wife.
WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1958), provides in part:
The husband shall have the management and control of community personal
property, with a like power of disposition as he has of his separate personal
property, except he shall not devise by will more than one-half thereof.
"See note 6 supra.
"The husband is a necessary party in actions involving community personal property,
Hynes v. Colman Dock Co., 108 Wash. 642, 185 P. 617 (1919). The wife is a necessary
party to actions involving community real property, Lownsdale v. The Gray's Harbor
Boom Co., 21 Wash. 542, 58 P. 663 (1899). Thus, in a suit for injury to the wife, the
husband was a necessary party, while the wife was only a proper party, Erhardt v.
Havens, Inc., 53 Wn. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958).
'Gannon v. Robinson, 59 Wn. 2d 906, 371 P.2d 274 (1962); Thygesen v. Neufelder,
9 Wash. 455, 37 P. 672 (1894); Oregon Improvement Co. v. Sagmeister, 4 Wash. 710,
30 P. 1058 (1892).
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origin. The statute probably cannot be read to affect community assets
in existence prior to August 11, 1969, although debts incurred prior to
that date are probably within the statute's purview. Both spouses
would appear to have some freedom to apply individual earnings to
satisfy antenuptial debts.
There remains, then, the statute's impact on accumulations. In pro-
viding that the accumulations of the debtor-spouse are available to
antenuptial creditors, the legislature could not have been referring to
separate accumulations. Those were already available. If the legisla-
ture is content to make available only the accumulations traceable to
earnings of the debtor spouse, it very likely has done so. Given exist-
ing doctrines relating to tracing, it might not have been necessary to
mention accumulations at all, however, unless the legislature intended
to avoid a narrow interpretation of the statute that would preclude,
tracing. If, instead, the legislature intended to make available all ac-
cumulations (including those which are community at inception)
acquired by the debtor spouse, but only to the extent of that spouse's
interest therein, it very likely has not succeeded. Absent clear evidence
of intent to produce that result, and certainly such evidence is lacking
here, the court is not likely to reverse long-standing holdings that
community assets cannot be partitioned. If partition is desired, the
legislature should provide that, for purposes of the statute, accumula-
tions acquired by the debtor spouse as community assets may be
partitioned. Such a provision would, however, severely limit the pro-
tection a community property system provides the non-debtor spouse.46
Had the legislature provided that the non-debtor spouse has no
interest in the accumulations of the other, to avoid a redundancy
similar to that discussed above, one would have to conclude that not
only would all accumulations acquired by the debtor spouse be sub-
ject, but, as well, the entire accumulation would be available. The
wisdom of such a provision is somewhat less than apparent, since the
protection afforded the non-debtor spouse is less here than if partition
were available. Absent an amendment to the contrary, then, the court
probably will find that only earnings of the debtor spouse, and accumu-
lations traceable thereto, are made available under the subject statute.
40 See note 37 supra.
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